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Abstract 
 
  
This paper measures the connectedness in EMU sovereign market volatility between 
April 1999 and January 2014, in order to monitor stress transmission and to identify 
episodes of intensive spillovers from one country to the others. To this end, we first 
perform a static and dynamic analysis to measure the total volatility connectedness in 
the entire period (the system-wide approach) using a framework recently proposed by 
Diebold and Yılmaz (2014). Second, we make use of a dynamic analysis to evaluate the 
net directional connectedness for each country and apply panel model techniques to 
investigate its determinants. Finally, to gain further insights, we examine the time-
varying behaviour of net pair-wise directional connectedness at different stages of the 
recent sovereign debt crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Regulatory convergence and the elimination of currency risk1 are two of the reasons 
behind the significant increase in cross-border financial activity in the euro area since 
the beginning of the twenty-first century (see Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2009 and Barnes et 
al., 2010). This effect has been even stronger in some of the EMU peripheral countries2. 
However, although cross-border banking clearly benefits risk diversification in 
businesses’ portfolios and is considered by monetary authorities as a hallmark of 
successful financial integration, it also presents some drawbacks. First, foreign capital is 
likely to be much more mobile than domestic capital; in a crisis situation, foreign banks 
may simply decide to “cut and run”. Moreover, in an integrated banking system, 
financial or sovereign crises in a country can quickly spill over into other countries. 
Indeed, given the high degree of interconnectedness in European financial markets, a 
major fear was that the default of the sovereign/banking sector in one EMU country 
could have spillover effects that might result in subsequent defaults in the euro area as a 
whole (see Schoenmaker and Wagner, 2013)3. 
In this context, an important reason and justification for providing financial support to 
Greece in May 2010 was precisely the “fear” of contagion (see, for instance, 
Constâncio, 2012), not only because there was a sudden loss of confidence among 
investors, who turned their attention to the macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances within 
EMU countries which had largely been ignored until then (see Beirne and Fratzscher, 
2013), but also because several European Union banks had a particularly high exposure 
to Greece (see Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013). 
Indeed, from late 2009 onwards, the demand for the German bund grew due its safe 
haven status, and yield spreads of euro area issues with respect to Germany spiralled 
(see Figure 1). Besides, since May 2010, not only has Greece been rescued twice, but 
Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus also needed bailouts to stay afloat.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
                                                          
1 The introduction of the Single Banking License in 1989 through the Second Banking Directive was a decisive step 
towards a unified European financial market, which subsequently led to a convergence in financial legislation and 
regulation across member countries. 
2 In particular, the sources of external financing for Portuguese and Greek banks radically shifted on joining the euro; 
traditionally reliant on dollar debt, their banks were subsequently able to raise funds from their counterparts 
elsewhere in the EMU (See Spiegel, 2009a and 2009b) 
3 Theoretical research modelling various aspects of the costs and benefits of cross-border banking (e.g. Dasgupta 
2004; Goldstein and Pauzner 2004;Wagner 2010) concludes that some degree of integration is beneficial but that an 
excessive degree may not be. 
In this scenario, where we have seen how crisis episodes in a given EMU sovereign 
market affect other markets almost instantaneously, some important questions have 
emerged that economists, policymakers, and practitioners need to address urgently. To 
what extent was the sovereign risk premium increase in the euro area during the 
European sovereign debt crisis due only to deteriorated debt sustainability in member 
countries? Did markets’ degree of connectedness play any significant role in this 
increase?  
Researchers have already studied transmission and/or contagion between sovereigns in 
the euro area context using a variety of methodologies (correlation-based measures, 
conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR), or Granger-causality approach, among others)4: 
Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012), Metiu (2012), Caporin et al. (2013), Beirne and 
Fratzscher (2013), Gorea and Radev (2014), Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) or 
Ludwig (2014) to name a few. 
Nevertheless, in this paper we will focus on the interconnection between EMU 
sovereign debt markets by applying a methodology which has not been widely used in 
this area. Specifically, we will make use of Diebold and Yilmaz (2014)’s measures of 
connectedness (both system-wide and pair-wise) in order to contribute to the literature 
on international transmission mechanisms that the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area 
has rekindled, and to be able to answer some of the previously posed questions. 
This literature includes two groups of theories which, though not necessarily mutually 
exclusive (see Dungey and Gajurel, 2013), have fostered considerable debate. On the 
one hand, since fundamentals of different countries may be interconnected by their 
cross-border flows of goods, services, and capital, or common shocks may adversely 
affect several economies simultaneously, transmission between countries may occur. 
These effects are known in the literature as “spillovers” (Masson, 1999), 
“interdependence” (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), or “fundamentals-based contagion” 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000). On the other hand, financial crises in one country may 
conceivably trigger crises elsewhere for reasons unexplained by macroeconomic 
fundamentals – perhaps because they lead to shifts in market sentiment, change the 
interpretation given to existing information, or trigger herding behaviour. This 
transmission mechanism is known in the literature as “pure contagion” (Masson, 1999). 
In this context, the measures of connectedness proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) 
                                                          
4 See Biblio et al. (2012) for a review of the measures proposed in the literature to estimate those linkages.  
can be considered as a bridge between the two visions mentioned above, since they 
examine volatility spillovers using useful information on agents’ expectations5, and 
sidestep the contentious issues associated with the definition and existence of episodes 
of “fundamentals-based” or “pure” contagion. 
A substantial amount of literature uses different extensions of Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2012)’s previous methodology to examine spillovers and transmission effects in stock, 
foreign exchange, or oil markets in non-EMU countries. Awartania et al. (2013), Lee 
and Chang (2013), Chau and Deesomsak (2014) and Cronin (2014) apply this 
methodology to examine spillovers in the United States’ markets; Yilmaz (2010), Zhou 
et al. (2012) or Narayan et al. (2014) focus on Asian countries; Apostolakisa and 
Papadopoulos (2014) and Tsai (2014) examine G-7 economies, and Duncan and 
Kabundi (2013) centre their analysis on South African markets. However, few papers to 
date have looked at the connectedness and spillover effects within euro area sovereign 
debt markets, even though quantifying the spillover risk is a very important tool in order 
to assess whether the benefits of a sovereign bailout may outweigh its costs. 
Some exceptions are Antonakakis and Vergos (2013), who examined spillovers between 
10 euro area government yield spreads during the period 2007-2012; Claeys and 
Vašicek (2014), who examined linkages between 16 European sovereign bond spreads 
during the period 2000-2012; Glover and Richards-Shubik (2014), who applied a model 
based on the literature on contagion in financial networks to data on sovereign credit 
default swap spreads (CDS) among 13 European sovereigns from 2005 to 2011; and 
Alter and Beyer (2014), who quantify spillovers between sovereign credit markets and 
banks in the euro area. While the above authors apply Diebold and Yilmaz’s 
methodology, Favero (2013) proposes an extension to Global Vector Autoregressive 
(GVAR) models to capture time-varying interdependence between EMU sovereign 
yield spreads.  
However, to our knowledge, no empirical analyses have been performed of the 
connectedness in sovereigns’ market volatility, in spite of its profound importance. As 
volatility reflects the extent to which the market evaluates and assimilates the arrival of 
new information, the analysis of its pattern of transmission may provide insights into 
the characteristics and dynamics of sovereign debt markets. This information might help 
                                                          
5 Since uncertainty is based on how much of the forecasting error variance cannot be explained by shocks in the 
variable, expectations gauge the evolution of both fundamental and market sentiment variables.  
to obtain a better understanding of yield evolution over time, providing a barometer for 
the vulnerability of these markets.  
Moreover, since volatility tracks investor fear, by measuring and analyzing the dynamic 
connectedness in volatility we are able to examine the “fear of connectedness” 
expressed by market participants as they trade. So, given that volatility tracks investors’ 
perceived risk and is a crisis-sensitive variable which can induce “volatility surprise” 
(Engle 1993), this paper centres on the analysis of connectedness in EMU sovereign 
debt market volatility using Diebold and Yilmaz (2014)’s methodology in order to fill 
the existing gap in the literature. 
Moreover, Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) showed that the connectedness framework was 
closely linked with both modern network theory (see Glover and Richards-Shubik, 
2014) and modern measures of systemic risk (see Ang and Longstaff, 2013 or 
Acemoglu et al., 2014). The degree of connectedness, on the other hand, measures the 
contribution of individual units to systemic network events, in a fashion very similar to 
the CoVaR of this unit (see, e. g., Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008). 
This paper explores this challenging avenue of research, focusing our study on 
connectedness in EMU sovereign bond market volatility during the period from April 
1999 to January 2014. However, unlike previous studies, in the analysis we will only 
include euro area countries and work with 10-year yields instead of spreads over the 
German bund, in order to be able to include Germany in the study.  
After explaining the methodology that will be used in the empirical analysis, we will 
proceed in four stages. First, in order to estimate system-wide connectedness, we will 
undertake a full-sample (static analysis) that is not only of intrinsic interest, but will also 
prepare the way for the second stage: the performance of a dynamic (rolling-sample) 
analysis of conditional connectedness. In the third stage, we will “zoom in” on the 
evolution of net directional connectedness in each market and assess whether their 
determinants differ between EMU central and peripheral countries. Finally, in the last 
stage we will examine how net pair-wise connectedness changes over the sample 
period.  
Overall, our results suggest that the positive influence exerted by economically sound 
core countries over peripheral ones in the stability period suddenly vanished with the 
outbreak of the crisis, when investors disavowed the shelter that peripheral countries  
could find in central countries and turned their attention to the major imbalances that 
they presented. Consequently, during the period of stability, beside the slight 
differences in yield behaviour (all followed the evolution of the German bund, and 
spreads moved in a very narrow range) it was the central countries that triggered net 
connectedness relationships; in the crisis period, however, there was a major shift and 
this role was now played by peripheral countries. Therefore, according to our results, in 
a context of increased cross-border financial activity in the euro-area, the concern that in 
turbulent times a shock in one country might have spillover effects into others may be 
well founded, and global financial stability may be threatened. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Diebold and Yılmaz 
(2014)’s methodology for assessing connectedness in financial market volatility, and the 
empirical results (both static and dynamic) obtained for our sample of EMU sovereign 
markets (a system-wide measure of connectedness). In Section 3 we present the 
empirical results regarding the evolution of net directional connectedness in each 
market, and explore its determinants. Section 4 examines the time-varying behaviour of 
net pair-wise directional connectedness at different stages of the current financial crisis. 
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the findings and offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Connectedness analysis  
2.1. Econometric methodology 
The main tool for measuring the amount of connectedness is based on a decomposition 
of the forecast error variance, which we will now briefly describe. 
Given a multivariate empirical time series, the forecast error variance decomposition 
results from the following steps: 
1. Fit a standard vector autoregressive (VAR) model to the series. 
2. Using series data up to and including time t, establish an H period-ahead forecast (up 
to time t + H). 
3. Decompose the error variance of the forecast for each component with respect to 
shocks from the same or other components at time t. 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) propose several connectedness measures built from pieces 
of variance decompositions in which the forecast error variance of variable i is 
decomposed into parts attributed to the various variables in the system. This section 
provides a summary of their connectedness index methodology. 
Let us denote by dHij the ij-th H-step variance decomposition component (i.e., the 
fraction of variable i’s H-step forecast error variance due to shocks in variable j). The 
connectedness measures are based on the “non-own”, or “cross”, variance 
decompositions, dHij, i, j = 1, . . . , N, i ≠ j.  
Consider an N-dimensional covariance-stationary data-generating process (DGP) with 
orthogonal shocks: ,)( tt uLx   ...,)( 2210  LLL .),( IuuE tt   Note that 
0 need not be diagonal. All aspects of connectedness are contained in this very general 
representation. Contemporaneous aspects of connectedness are summarized in 0 and 
dynamic aspects in ,...}.,{ 21   Transformation of ,...},{ 21   via variance 
decompositions is needed to reveal and compactly summarize connectedness. Diebold 
and Yilmaz (2014) propose a connectedness table such as Table 1 to understand the 
various connectedness measures and their relationships. Its main upper-left NxN block, 
which contains the variance decompositions, is called the “variance decomposition 
matrix," and is denoted by ].[ ij
H dD   The connectedness table increases HD  with a 
rightmost column containing row sums, a bottom row containing column sums, and a 
bottom-right element containing the grand average, in all cases for i ≠ j. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The off-diagonal entries of HD are the parts of the N forecast-error variance 
decompositions of relevance from a connectedness perspective. In particular, the gross 
pair-wise directional connectedness from j to i is defined as follows: 
.Hij
H
ji dC   
Since in general ,H ij
H
ji CC    the net pair-wise directional connectedness from j to i, 
can be defined as: 
.H ji
H
ij
H
ij CCC    
As for the off-diagonal row sums in Table 1, they give the share of the H-step forecast-
error variance of variable xi coming from shocks arising in other variables (all others, as 
opposed to a single other), while the off-diagonal column sums provide the share of the 
H-step forecast-error variance of variable xi going to shocks arising in other variables. 
Hence, the off-diagonal row and column sums, labelled “from" and “to" in the 
connectedness table, offer the total directional connectedness measures. In particular, 
total directional connectedness from others to i is defined as 
,
1

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N
ij
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and total directional connectedness to others from i is defined as 
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H
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We can also define net total directional connectedness as 
.  HiH iHi CCC  
Finally, the grand total of the off-diagonal entries in DH (equivalently, the sum of the 
“from" column or “to" row) measures total connectedness: 
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For the case of non-orthogonal shocks, the variance decompositions are not as easily 
calculated as before, because the variance of a weighted sum is not an appropriate sum 
of variances; in this case, methodologies for providing orthogonal innovations like 
traditional Cholesky-factor identification may be sensitive to ordering. So, following 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), a generalized VAR decomposition (GVD), invariant to 
ordering, proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) will be used. The 
H-step generalized variance decomposition matrix is defined as gH gHijD d    , where 
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In this case, je  is a vector with jth element unity and zeros elsewhere, h  is the 
coefficient matrix in the infinite moving-average representation from VAR,   is the 
covariance matrix of the shock vector in the non-orthogonalized-VAR, jj  being its jth 
diagonal element. In this GVD framework, the lack of orthogonality means that the 
rows of gHijd  do not have sum unity and, in order to obtain a generalized connectedness 
index g gijD d    , the following normalization is necessary: 
1
g
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The matrix g gijD d     permits us to define similar concepts as defined before for the 
orthogonal case, that is, total directional connectedness, net total directional 
connectedness, and total connectedness. 
 
2.2. Data 
We use daily data of 10-year bond yield volatility built on data collected from the 
Thomson Reuters Datastream for eleven EMU countries: both central (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) and peripheral countries 
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Our sample begins on 1 April 1999 and 
ends on 27 January 2014 (i.e., a total of 3,868 observations)6, spanning several 
important financial market episodes in addition to the crisis of 2007-2008 – in 
particular, the euro area sovereign debt crisis from 2009 onwards. 
 
2.3. Static (full-sample, unconditional) analysis 
The full-sample connectedness table appears as Table 2. As mentioned above, the ijth 
entry of the upper-left 11x11 country submatrix gives the estimated ijth pair-wise 
directional connectedness contribution to the forecast error variance of country i’s 
volatility yields coming from innovations to country j. Hence, the off-diagonal column 
sums (labelled TO) and row sums (labelled FROM) gives the total directional 
connectedness to all others from i and from all others to i respectively. The bottom-most 
row (labelled NET) gives the difference in total directional connectedness (to-from). 
Finally, the bottom-right element (in boldface) is total connectedness.  
                                                          
6 The sample starts in April 1999 since data for Greece are only available from that date onwards. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
As can be seen, the diagonal elements (own connectedness) are the largest individual 
elements in the table, but total directional connectedness (from others or to others) tends 
to be much larger, except for the EMU peripheral countries. In addition, the spread of 
the “from” degree distribution is noticeably greater than that of the “to” degree 
distribution for six out of the eleven cases under study. 
Regarding pair-wise directional connectedness (the off-diagonal elements of the upper-
left 11 × 11 submatrix), the highest observed pair-wise connectedness is from Italy to 
Spain (34.03%). In return, the pair-wise connectedness from Spain to Italy (25.27%) is 
the second-highest. The highest value of pair-wise directional connectedness between 
EMU central countries is from France to Austria (20.03%), followed by that from 
France to the Netherlands (18.85%). The total directional connectedness from others, 
which measures the share of volatility shocks received from other bond yields in the 
total variance of the forecast error for each bond yield, ranges between 7.34% (Greece) 
and 79.95% (Germany). As for the total directional connectedness to others, our results 
suggest that it varies from a low of 13.17% for Greece to 78.58% for Finland: a range of 
65.41 points for connectedness to others, lower than the range of 72.61 points found for 
connectedness from others. Finally, we obtain a value of 54.23% for the total 
connectedness between the eleven countries under study for the full sample (system-
wide measure) – significantly lower than the value of 78.3% obtained by Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2014) for US financial institutions, or the 97.2% found by Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2012) for international financial markets. 
 
2.4 Dynamic (rolling, conditional) analysis  
The full-sample connectedness analysis provides a good characterization of 
“unconditional” aspects of the connectedness measures. However, it does not help us to 
understand the connectedness dynamics. The appeal of connectedness methodology lies 
in its use as a measure of how quickly return or volatility shocks spread across countries 
as well as within a country. This section presents an analysis of dynamic connectedness 
which relies on rolling estimation windows.  
The dynamic connectedness analysis starts with total connectedness, and then moves on 
to net directional connectedness across countries in Section 3. 
2.4.1. Total connectedness 
In Figures 1 to 3 we plot total volatility connectedness over 200-day rolling-sample 
windows and using 10 days as the predictive horizon for the underlying variance 
decomposition. In Figure 1 the rolling total connectedness is plotted along with the 
evolution of daily 10-year sovereign yields, while in Figures 2 and 3 it is plotted 
separately.  
In Figure 1, we can identify two distinct periods in the evolution of the total level of 
connectedness, which coincide with the evolution of 10-year yields. In the first period 
(which we will term the “stability period”), the level of connectedness of the EMU 
sovereign debt market is high, matching the close evolution of 10-year yields (the 
spreads moved in a narrow range and reached values close to zero). Neither the US 
subprime crisis of August 2007 nor the Lehman Brothers Collapse of September 2008 
seemed to have a substantial effect on, euro area sovereign debt markets and their high 
level of connectedness.  
However, in April 2009, coinciding with a statement by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) expressing its fears of a slowdown in financial market integration, and only some 
months before Papandreou’s government announced Greece’s distressed debt position 
(November 2009)7, sovereign yields begin to spiral and total connectedness began a 
downturn trend. From then on, in parallel with the increase in sovereign yields, 
connectedness decreased and entered a different regime. These results are in 
concordance with Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) who, by applying the 
Quandt–Andrews and Bai and Perron tests (1998, 2003), allowed the data to select 
when regime shifts occur in each potential causal relationship. Their results suggest that 
69 out of the 110 breakpoints (i.e., 63%) occurred after November 2009, after 
Papandreou’s government had revealed that its finances were far worse than previously 
announced.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
                                                          
7 In November 2009, Papandreou’s government disclosed that its financial situation was far worse than it had 
previously announced, with a yearly deficit of 12.7% of GDP – four times more than the euro area’s limit,  and more 
than double the previously published figure – and a public debt of $410 billion. We should recall that this 
announcement only served to worsen the severe crisis in the Greek economy; the country’s debt rating was lowered 
to BBB+ (the lowest in the euro zone) on 8 December. These episodes marked the beginning of the euro area’s 
sovereign debt crisis. 
 
Moreover, the existence of two different regimes in the evolution of connectedness8 and 
the abrupt decrease in the mean in the second regime may explain the low value 
(54.23%) obtained for the total connectedness (system-wide measure) between the 
eleven countries studied over the full period. Therefore, since the second regime 
coincides with the euro area sovereign debt crisis, we will focus our analysis on this 
period (denoted as the crisis period and spanning from April 2009 to January 2014) 
which has been split into five sub-periods.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
The first sub-period (a), which spans from June 2009 until 23 April  2010 (when Greece 
requested financial support), can still be defined as a pre-crisis period, since the 
downtrend in the total level of connectedness in euro area sovereign debt markets is 
suddenly reversed. However, during sub-periods (b) and (c) this downtrend deepens. 
Indeed, sub-period (b) – from April 2010 to August 2011 – was a time of real 
turbulence in EMU sovereign debt markets: rescue packages were put in place not only 
in Greece (May 2010), but also in Ireland (November 2010) and Portugal (April 2011), 
and at the end of it (August 2011) the ECB announced its second covered bond 
purchase program. As noted, the uncertainty continued in European debt markets during 
sub-period (c) (August 2011 - July 2012). During this phase, Italy was in the middle of 
a political crisis and the main rating agencies lowered the ratings not only of peripheral 
countries but of Austria and France as well. In this context of financial distress and huge 
liquidity problems, the ECB responded forcefully (along with other central banks) by 
implementing nonstandard monetary policies – that is, policies that went further than 
setting the refinancing rate. In particular, the ECB’s principal means of intervention 
were the so-called long term refinancing operations (LTRO) 9. In November 2011 and 
March 2012, the ECB provided banks with a sum close to 500 billion Euros for a three-
                                                          
8 Formal mean and volatility tests (not shown here to save space, but available from the authors upon request) 
strongly reject the null hypothesis of equality in mean and variance before and after 6 April 2009. 
 
9 When the crisis struck, big central banks like the US Federal Reserve slashed their overnight interest-rates in order 
to boost the economy. However, even cutting the rate as far as it could go (to almost zero) failed to spark recovery. 
The Fed then began experimenting with other tools to encourage banks to pump money into the economy. One of 
them was Quantitative Easing (QE). To carry out QE, central banks create money by buying securities, such as 
government bonds, from banks, with electronic cash that did not exist before. The new money swells the size of bank 
reserves in the economy by the quantity of assets purchased—hence “quantitative” easing. In the euro area, the 
principal means of intervention adopted by the ECB was the LTRO, which differed notably from the QE policies of 
the Federal Reserve, in which the Fed purchased assets outright rather than helping to fund banks’ ability to purchase 
them. The LTRO is not the only non-standard monetary policy to have been implemented by the ECB since the crisis. 
Other measures were the narrowing of the corridor, the change in eligibility criteria for collateral, interventions in the 
covered bonds market and, most importantly, the ECB’s launch of the security market program in 2010 involving 
interventions in the secondary sovereign bond market. The latter program was discontinued in 2011. 
year period. However, in March 2012 the second rescue package to Greece was 
approved, and in June 2012 Spain requested financial assistance to recapitalize its 
banking sector. This was the backdrop to the ECB’s President Mario Draghi’s statement 
that he would do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro”. Sub-period (d), which starts 
after that statement in July 2012, clearly reflects the healing effects of Draghi’s words 
since a substantial increase in the level of total connectedness can be observed in EMU 
sovereign debt markets. Nonetheless, our indicator definitely registered a new 
slowdown in March 2013, when Cyprus requested financial support. Therefore, the last 
sub-period (e) spans from that date to the end of the sample (January 2014). 
 
3. Net directional connectedness 
The net directional connectedness index provides information about how much each 
country’s sovereign bond yield volatility contributes in net terms to other countries’ 
sovereign bond yield volatilities and, like the full sample dynamic measure presented in 
the previous section, also relies on rolling estimation windows. The time varying-
indicators are displayed in Figures 4a and 4b for central and peripheral EMU countries 
respectively. 
[Insert Figures 4a and 4b here] 
Regarding the whole sample, it is noticeable that in three cases [the Netherlands and 
Finland (see Figure 4a) along with Portugal (see Figure 4b)], more than 50% of the 
computed values are positive, indicating that during most of the sample period, their 
bond yield volatility influenced that of the rest of EMU countries, whereas for the 
remaining countries the opposite is true (i.e., they are net receivers during most of the 
period). Interestingly, for Germany we obtain negative values in 84% of the sample. 
When we split the sample into stability and crisis periods, a different picture emerges. 
Before the crisis, with the exception of Portugal, net triggers were mainly central 
countries, with a percentage of positive values of 85%, 75%, 65%, 61% and 58% for the 
Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Austria and France, respectively (see Figure 4a). 
However, during the crisis period, these countries became net receivers, with negative 
values of 100%, 99%, 98%, 95% and 92% for France, Finland, Belgium, Netherlands 
and Austria respectively. In this second period, Germany also appears as a net receiver 
with a negative value of 100%. Regarding peripheral countries (Figure 4b), four of the 
five countries studied were net receivers during the stability period, with negative 
values of 78%, 57%, 55% and 52% in the cases of Greece, Ireland, Spain and Italy 
respectively; during the crisis period Greece and Portugal became net triggers, with 
positive values of 99% and 52% respectively. 
 
3.1 Determinants of net directional connectedness 
3.1.1 Econometric methodology 
After evaluating net directional connectedness, we use panel model techniques to 
analyse their determinants. We adopt an eclectic approach and apply a general-to-
specific modelling strategy to empirically evaluate the relevance of the highest number 
of variables that have been proposed in the recent theoretical and empirical literature as 
potential drivers of EMU sovereign bond yields. 
Since the potential determinants are available at monthly or quarterly frequency, we 
generate a new dependent variable by computing the monthly average of the daily net 
directional connectedness for each country. 
 
3.1.2. Instruments for modelling net directional connectedness  
We consider two groups of potential determinants of net directional connectedness: 
macroeconomic fundamental variables, and indicators of market sentiments. Regarding 
the macro-fundamentals, we use measures of the country’s fiscal position (the 
government debt-to-GDP and the government debt-to-GDP, DEB and DEF hereafter), 
the overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt (which is considered a good proxy of 
liquidity differences among markets, LIQ)10, the current-account-balance-to-GDP ratio 
(CAC) as a proxy of the foreign debt and the net position of the country towards the rest 
of the world, and the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices monthly inter-annual rate 
of growth (as a measure of inflation, INF and the country’s loss of competitiveness). 
With respect to market sentiment proxies, we use the consumer confidence indicator 
(CCI) to gauge economic agents’ perceptions of future economic activity, and the 
                                                          
10 Given the large size differences observed between EMU peripheral sovereign debt markets (see Gómez-Puig and 
Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013), it is likely that the overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt (which is considered a 
measure of market depth because larger markets may present lower information costs since their securities are likely 
to trade frequently, and a relative large number of investors may own or may have analyzed their features) might be a 
good proxy of liquidity differences between markets. Indeed, some of the literature suggests that market size is an 
important factor in the success of a debt market. Nevertheless, there is another reason to choose this variable: it might 
capture an additional benefit of large markets to the extent that the ‘‘too big to fail theory’’ (TFTF), taken from the 
banking system, might also hold in sovereign debt markets.  
monthly standard deviation of equity returns (EVOL) in each country to capture local 
stock market volatility11. A summary with the definition and sources of all the 
explanatory variables used is presented in Appendix A. 
 
3.1.3. Empirical results  
Our empirical analysis starts with a general unrestricted statistical model including all 
explanatory variables to capture the essential characteristics of the underlying dataset. 
We use standard testing procedures to reduce its complexity by eliminating statistically 
insignificant variables. We check the validity of the reductions at each stage in order to 
ensure the congruence of the finally selected model and thus to identify the variables 
that best explain the developments. 
 
Tables 3 to 5 show the final results for three groups of countries: all 11 EMU countries 
under study, EMU central countries, and EMU peripheral countries throughout the 
sample period: 2000:01-2014:01. The reason for splitting the sample into these two 
groups is that, based on a country-by-country analysis, it can be concluded that EMU 
countries under study are not homogeneous but comprise two categories. Therefore, this 
division12 makes it possible to differentiate the impact of potential determinants on bond 
spreads in core and peripheral countries. We report only the results obtained using the 
relevant model in each case13: the Random Effects (RE) model in the case of all EMU 
countries and peripheral EMU countries; and the Fixed Effects (FE) model for the 
central EMU countries.  
[Insert Tables 3 to 5 here] 
The first column in these tables do not take into account the dynamic properties of net 
directional connectedness; they show the results for the whole period (pre-crisis and 
crisis) in order to select the best model for use in the rest of the analysis after having 
eliminated statistically insignificant variables. However, since we have previously 
detected a potential structural change in April 2009, we analyse the differences in the 
significance of the coefficients over time (i.e., during the stability and the crisis 
periods).  
                                                          
11 We would expect a positive relationship between the variables CAC, LIQ and CCI with net directional 
connectedness; whereas the relationship would be negative for the variables DEB, DEF, INF and EVOL. 
12 This classification of EMU central and peripheral countries follows the standard division presented in the literature. 
13   
 
 Therefore, in addition to the independent variables chosen a dummy (DCRISIS), which 
takes the value 1 in the crisis period (and 0, otherwise) is also introduced in the 
estimations, and the coefficients of the interactions between this dummy and the rest of 
variables are calculated (see Gómez-Puig, 2006 and 2008). Thus, the marginal effects of 
each variable are: 
 
β = β1 + β2DCRISIS 
 
We honestly think that a formal coefficient test H0: β1 = β1 + β2, to assess whether the 
impact of independent variables on net directional connectedness changed significantly 
with the start of the sovereign debt crisis is unnecessary as long as β2 is significant. So 
the marginal coefficients of a variable are: 
  
β = β1 (in the stability period) 
β = β1 + β2 (in the crisis period) 
 
The second column in Tables 3 to 5 shows the re-estimation results with the DCRISIS 
dummy. Looking across the columns in these tables we see that, when examining the 
variables measuring market sentiment in all eleven countries (Table 3) we find a 
negative and significant effect for the stock-market volatility (EVOL), whereas, as 
expected, the consumer confidence indicator (CCI) presents a positive sign. As for the 
local macro-fundamentals, our results suggest a negative impact on the net directional 
connectedness of variables measuring the fiscal position (both the debt and the deficit-
to-GDP). Moreover, without exception, all marginal effects register an increase in the 
crisis period compared to the pre-crisis one. This rise in the sensitivity to both 
fundamentals and market sentiment during the crisis period compared with the pre-crisis 
is in line with the previous empirical literature (see Gómez-Puig et al., 2014, among 
others). 
 
Our analysis also highlights the differences between the two groups of EMU countries, 
central and peripheral. In net directional connectedness episodes triggered by peripheral 
countries, variables that gauge market participants’ perceptions seem to present a higher 
relevance, while macroeconomic fundamentals seem to play a greater role in 
relationships where central countries are the triggers. In the latter case (see Table 4), 
three variables gauging macroeconomic fundamentals are significant with the expected 
sign (the loss of competitiveness (INF), the Government deficit-to-GDP (DEB) and the 
net position towards the rest of the word (CAC)); whilst in the former (see Table 5) only 
the variable that captures the government deficit-to-GDP (DEF) turns out to be 
significant. With regard to the variables measuring market sentiment, in the two sub-
samples we find a negative and significant effect for stock-market volatility (EVOL), 
whereas, as expected, the consumer confidence indicator (CCI) presents a positive 
sign14. Again, without exception, for the two groups of countries all marginal effects 
register an increase during the crisis compared to the pre-crisis period. 
 
Therefore, our results indicate that the crisis had a significant impact on the markets’ 
reactions to financial news, especially in the peripheral countries. In this respect, some 
authors have argued that the financial crisis might spread from one country to another 
due to market imperfection or the herding behaviour of international investors. A crisis 
in one country may give a “wake-up call” to international investors to reassess the risks 
in other countries; uninformed or less informed investors may find it difficult to extract 
the signal from the falling price and follow the strategies of better informed investors, 
thus generating excess co-movements across the markets. The findings presented by 
Beirne and Fratscher (2013), for instance, also indicate that for some EMU countries 
such as peripheral countries there is strong evidence of this “wake-up call” contagion, 
though for other countries there is much less evidence of this kind since the relevance of 
macroeconomic fundamentals is higher. 
 
4. Net pair-wise directional connectedness  
So far, we have discussed the behaviour of the total connectedness and total net 
directional connectedness measures for eleven EMU sovereign debt markets. However, 
we have also examined their net pair-wise directional connectedness.  
[Insert Figures 5a and 5b here] 
 
                                                          
14 The only variable that does not turn out to be significant in any of the estimations is our proxy for the market 
liquidity. 
Specifically, Figure 5a displays net pair-wise directional connectedness during the two 
detected regimes, whilst Figure 5b presents the results obtained during the five sub-
periods into which the crisis period has been divided.  
Both figures present very interesting results. Figure 5a shows that while in the stability 
period central countries are the triggers in the connectedness relationships, in the crisis 
regime, these relationships are stronger when the trigger is a peripheral country. These 
results corroborate those presented in Figure 4 where we plotted net dynamic directional 
connectedness in both core and peripheral countries.  
In particular, in the stability period, connectedness relationships departing from central 
countries accounted for 75% of the total, and in the tenth and twentieth percentile all the 
receiver countries are peripheral (Greece, Ireland and Italy). Conversely, in the crisis 
period, the connectedness relationships account for 59% of the total when peripheral 
countries are the triggers (in the tenth and twentieth percentile, only three relationships 
are detected departing from central countries), and although receivers are mostly 
peripheral, central countries still account for 41% of the total. 
These results are very illuminating since they reinforce the idea that during the first ten 
years of currency union, investors’ risk aversion was very low since they overestimated 
the healing effect that economically sound central countries might have on the rest of 
the Eurozone. However, the situation radically changed with the advent of the crisis; 
suddenly, market participants focused their attention on the substantial macroeconomic 
imbalances that some peripheral countries presented which not only would eventually 
lead them to default, but might also affect central countries that held important shares of 
the sovereign assets of those countries (the results suggest that both peripheral and 
central countries are net receivers of the connectedness relationships that mainly depart 
from peripheral countries). 
Moreover, the main conclusions that can be drawn from Figure 5b, which displays the 
evolution of the net pair-wise directional connectedness during the five crisis sub-
periods, are the following.  
During sub-period (a), the period just before the beginning of the euro-area sovereign 
debt crisis (marked by Papandreou’s disclosure of Greece’s distressed public finances in 
November 2009), we not only detect a significant number (25) of net pair-wise 
relationships, but in 72% of the cases central countries are still the triggers. However, an 
important difference with respect to the pre-crisis period is that peripheral countries 
carry less weight as receivers. In this sub-period, they account for 60% of the total, 
while the rest (40%) are central countries, showing that the effects of the crisis have 
clearly extended to the central countries.  
Nonetheless, the situation radically changes in sub-period (b), which includes the bail-
outs of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. In this phase not only does the number of 
connectedness relationships decrease from 25 to 14, but their direction changes as well. 
In this second sub-period of the crisis, net pair-wise connectedness relationships mainly 
occur between peripheral countries, which have a weight of around 71% both as triggers 
and as receivers. Besides, it is worth noting that during this phase two central countries 
remain disconnected from the rest: the Netherlands and Finland. During sub-period (c), 
which includes the support to the Spanish banking sector, Figure 3 shows that the total 
level of connectedness still registers a downturn trend; but although the number of 
connectedness relationships remains low (15), the amount detected in the tenth 
percentile clearly increases (up to 80%). Another significant development is the fact that 
central countries recover their role in the relationships as both triggers and receivers 
(67% of the total).  
However, after Mario Draghi’s statement in July 2012 (sub-period d), a clear shift is 
observed. Now, net pair-wise relationships rise to 33 (even more than in sub-period (a)) 
and not only is the role of central countries as triggers stressed (they represent 76% of 
the total), but peripheral countries also recover their role as receivers, returning to the 
level of the pre-crisis period (64%). Finally, in the last sub-period (which begins with 
the rescue of Cyprus), we again observe a decrease in the number of pair-wise 
connectedness relationships; however, the majority of them take place between 
peripheral countries, both as triggers (53% of the total) and as receivers (65%). 
 
5. Concluding remarks. 
Our analysis, which has focused on the study of connectedness in EMU sovereign bond 
yields volatility during the period April 1999 to January 2014, may enhance the 
understanding of cross-market volatility dynamics in times of both turbulence and calm, 
and may help to assess the risk of crisis transmission. We stress the paper’s important 
methodological contribution: that is, the use of the ‘volatility surprise’ component 
(along with other traditional measures of volatility) to fully apprehend the sensitivity of 
financial markets to volatility shocks. 
The main contributions of our research can be summarized as follows. In the first step, 
we found a system-wide value of 54.23% for the total connectedness between the eleven 
countries under study for the full sample period. This level is much lower than that 
obtained by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012, 2014) for international financial markets and 
US financial institutions respectively. However, it should be understood in the context 
of the results obtained in the second step, in which we analyse the dynamic nature of 
total net connectedness.  
In Figures 1 to 3, which plot total volatility connectedness, we clearly identify two 
distinct periods in its evolution which coincide with the evolution of 10-year yields. 
Indeed, the existence of these two different regimes in the evolution of connectedness 
has been empirically tested and corroborated. In the first period, the level of 
connectedness of EMU sovereign debt markets is very high, closely matching the 
evolution of 10-year yields. However, in the second period, which begins only a few 
months before Papandreou’s government announced Greece’s distressed debt position 
(November 2009), connectedness began a downturn trend. Consequently, the substantial 
decrease in the level of connectedness in EMU sovereign debt markets, along with the 
unfolding of the crisis, may explain its low average value in the static analysis for the 
whole sample period.  
In the third step, we calculated the net directional connectedness index which provides 
information about how much each country’s sovereign bond yield volatility contributes 
in net terms to other countries’ sovereign bond yield volatilities. Our empirical evidence 
shows that, for the whole sample, in three cases (the Netherlands, Finland and Portugal), 
their bond yield volatility influenced that of the rest of EMU countries, whereas the 
remaining countries are net receivers. The empirical evidence also suggests that during 
the stability period, the triggers of the net connectedness relationships are mainly central 
countries, but during the crisis, they are mostly peripheral countries.  
In a further step, we used panel data techniques to analyse the drivers of net directional 
connectedness in each country. Our results once again highlight the differences between 
the two groups of EMU countries, central and peripheral. In net directional 
connectedness episodes triggered by peripheral countries, variables that gauge market 
participants’ perceptions seem to present a higher relevance, while macroeconomic 
fundamentals appear to play a greater role in relationships where central countries are 
the triggers. Moreover, without exception, all marginal effects register an increase in the 
crisis compared to the pre-crisis period.  
Finally, in the last step we examined net pair-wise directional connectedness among the 
11 EMU countries, both in the two regimes detected and during the five sub-periods in 
which the crisis period has been divided. Our findings corroborate the conclusions 
drawn from the third step regarding the direction of net connectedness and provide 
further insights into both their intensity and their behaviour during the five sub-periods 
of the crisis. 
Overall, our results support the hypothesis that peripheral countries imported credibility 
from central countries during the first ten years of EMU. Nevertheless, the outbreak of 
the crisis ushered in a sudden shift in the sentiment of market participants who now paid 
more attention to the significant macroeconomic imbalances in some of the peripheral 
countries and the possibility of contagion to central countries.  
To sum up, the analysis in this paper suggests that the sovereign risk premium increase 
in the euro area during the European sovereign debt crisis was not only due to 
deteriorated debt sustainability in member countries, but also to a shift in the origin of 
connectedness relationships which, as the crisis unfolded, mostly departed from 
peripheral countries. In this context, where cross-border financial activity was very 
important and market sentiment indicators played a key role in explaining 
connectedness relationships triggered by peripheral countries, the risk that the default of 
the sovereign/banking sector in one of these countries might spread to other countries 
could not be disregarded by financial authorities and policymakers with responsibility 
for ensuring financial stability. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Definition of the explanatory variables to model net directional 
connectedness 
 
A.1. Variables that measure local macro-fundamentals. 
Variable Description Source 
Net position  
vis-à-vis 
the rest of the 
world 
(CAC)  
Current-account-balance-to-GDP 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations. 
 
OECD 
Competitiveness 
(INF) 
Inflation rate. HICP monthly inter-annual rate 
of growth 
Eurostat  
 
Fiscal Position 
(DEF and DEB) 
 
Government debt-to-GDP and Government 
deficit-to-GDP. Monthly data are linearly 
interpolated from quarterly observations. 
 
Eurostat  
 
Market liquidity 
(LIQ) 
 
Domestic Debt Securities. Public Sector 
Amounts Outstanding (billions of US dollars) 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations.  
 
BIS Debt securities statistics. 
Table 18  
 
 
 
A.2. Variables that measure local market sentiment. 
Variable Description Source 
 
Stock Volatility 
(EVOL) 
Monthly standard deviation of the daily 
returns of each country’s stock market 
general index 
 
Datastream 
 
Consumer 
Confidence 
Indicator 
(CCI) 
  
 
This index is built up by the European 
Commission which conducts regular 
harmonised surveys to consumers in each 
country. 
 
European Commission (DG 
ECFIN) 
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Table 1: Schematic connectedness table 
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Table 2: Full-sample connectedness 
  
GER 
 
FRA 
 
ITA 
 
SPA 
 
NET 
 
BEL 
 
AUS 
 
GRE 
 
FIN 
 
POR 
 
IRE 
 
Contribution 
From Others 
GER 20.05 18.39 2.83 1.34 17.09 9.79 13.04 0.08 17.20 0.07 0.12 79.95 
FRA 10.38 29.44 1.10 0.29 14.93 13.11 15.48 0.41 14.71 0.09 0.07 70.56 
ITA 0.52 0.36 68.00 25.27 0.67 3.08 0.30 0.00 0.76 0.13 0.90 32.00 
SPA 0.22 0.03 34.03 61.69 0.20 1.69 0.08 0.08 0.34 0.38 1.26 38.31 
NET 12.24 18.85 2.74 0.50 20.64 12.72 14.75 0.01 17.38 0.16 0.02 79.36 
BEL 4.89 10.26 12.36 4.91 8.97 41.10 8.48 0.34 8.41 0.10 0.16 58.90 
AUS 9.13 20.03 1.06 0.19 15.11 14.00 23.83 0.55 15.93 0.16 0.01 76.17 
GRE 0.10 0.23 2.89 2.13 0.10 0.12 0.01 92.66 0.03 1.05 0.67 7.34 
FIN 12.09 18.65 3.23 1.04 17.09 11.55 15.74 0.10 20.39 0.09 0.03 79.61 
POR 0.01 0.37 10.13 13.34 0.04 0.04 0.36 10.44 0.04 54.45 10.80 45.55 
IRE 0.07 0.36 8.28 10.23 0.00 1.02 0.12 2.70 0.01 6.04 71.18 28.82 
Contribution 
To Others 
71.23 74.83 53.63 48.99 78.24 62.02 74.15 13.69 78.58 13.17 16.48 54.23 
Net 
Contribution 
(To –From) 
Others 
 
-8.72 
 
4.27 
 
21.63 
 
10.68 
 
-1.12 
 
3.13 
 
-2.02 
 
6.34 
 
-1.03 
 
-2.37 
 
-2.34 
 
 
Note: GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland respectively. 
Table 3. Panel regression: All countries 
 Without dummy With dummy 
Constant 2.5705* 
(3.8189) 
2.8238* 
(3.4237) 
DCRISIS  -0.7563* 
(-4.2693) 
Macrofundamentals 
DEF -0.2132* 
(-3.8710) 
-0.2009* 
(-3.4541) 
DCRISIS*DEF  -0.0056* 
(-3. 2530) 
DEB -0.0146* 
(-6.8134) 
-0.0122* 
(-5.4660) 
DCRISIS*DEB  -0.0041* 
(-3.1127) 
Market sentiments 
CCI 0.3078* 
(7.1324) 
0.2809* 
(7.1762) 
DCRISIS*CCI  0.0079* 
(5.7277) 
EVOL -0.0085* 
(-8.1645) 
-0.0080* 
(-8.3530) 
DCRISIS*EVOL  -0.0001* 
(-4.3770) 
R2 0.8512 0.8497 
Observations 1694 
Notes: RE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-
statistics, computed using White (1980)’s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the square brackets below the 
specification tests are the associated p-values. * indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
Table 4. Panel regression: Central countries 
 Without dummy With dummy 
Constant 1.9715* 
(6.8140) 
1.8426* 
(6.1825) 
DCRISIS  -0.1288* 
(-3.8916) 
Macrofundamentals 
INF -1.0207* 
(4.2092) 
-1.0624* 
(3.9951) 
DCRISIS*INF  -0.0303* 
(-3.7634) 
DEB -0.1357* 
(-6.4410) 
-0.1301* 
(-6.4372) 
DCRISIS*DEB  -0.0066* 
(-3.6941) 
CAC 0.2327* 
(3.7058) 
0.2431* 
(4.1258) 
DCRISIS*CAC  0.0012* 
(2.9584) 
Market sentiments 
CCI 0.2201* 
(6.4104) 
0.2139* 
(6.4615) 
DCRISIS*CCI  0.0053* 
(3.7134) 
EVOL -0.0068* 
(-6.0229) 
-0.0066* 
(-5.7843) 
DCRISIS*EVOL  -0.0003* 
(-4.1013) 
R2  
Within 
Between 
Overall 
 
0.5726 
0.7146 
0.4415 
 
0.7394 
0.7349 
0.7472 
Observations 924 
Notes: FE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics, 
computed using White (1980)’s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the square brackets below the 
specification tests are the associated p-values. * indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Panel regression: Peripheral countries. 
 Without dummy With dummy 
Constant 11.4278* 
(12.0155) 
10.2377* 
(10.3152) 
DCRISIS  -0.5198* 
(-13.3843) 
Macrofundamentals 
DEF -0.4408* 
(-3.8791) 
-0.4130* 
(-3.7687) 
DCRISIS*DEF  -0.0105* 
(-3.7596) 
Market sentiments 
CCI 0.7817* 
(12.3218) 
0.8152* 
(11.1011) 
DCRISIS*CCI  0.0130* 
(10.9831) 
EVOL -0.0004* 
(-8.2425) 
-0.0005* 
(-7.1149) 
DCRISIS*EVOL  -0.0002* 
(-3.8954) 
R2 0.8572 0.8674 
Observations 780 
Notes: RE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-
statistics, computed using White (1980)’s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the square brackets below the 
specification tests are the associated p-values. * indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
Figure 1: Daily 10-year sovereign yields in EMU countries and rolling total connectedness: 
      
Figure 2: Rolling total connectedness throughout the period (1/13/2000-1/27/2014) 
 
Figure 3: Rolling total connectedness after the breakpoint (6/4/2009-1/27/2014) 
    
Figure 4a: Net directional connectedness-EMU Central countries 
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Figure 4b: Net directional connectedness- EMU Peripheral countries 
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Figure 5a: Net pair-wise directional connectedness before and after breakpoint 
 
1/13/2000 to 4/5/2009 (before breakpoint) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4/6/2009 to 1/27/2014 (after breakpoint) 
 
 
 
Notes: We show the most important directional connections among the 55 pairs of the 10-year bond yields under study. Black, red and orange links (black, grey and light grey when viewed in 
grayscale) correspond to the tenth, twentieth and thirtieth percentiles of all net pair-wise directional connections. Node size indicates sovereign debt market size. GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, 
BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland respectively.  
Figure 5b: Net pair-wise directional connectedness during the five sub-periods after breakpoint 
Sub-period (a): 4/6/2009 to 4/22/2010 
 
Sub-period (b): 4/23/2010 to 7/31/2011 
 
Sub-period (c): 8/1/2011 to 6/30/2012 
 
 
                       Sub-period (d): 7/1/2012 to 3/15/2013 
                       
 
                  Sub-period (e): 3/16/2013 to 1/27/2014                                             
  
 
Notes: We show the most important directional connections among the 55 pairs of the 10-year bond yields under study. Black, red and orange links (black, grey and light grey when viewed in 
grayscale) correspond to the tenth, twentieth and thirtieth percentiles of all net pair-wise directional connections. Node size indicates sovereign debt market size. GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, 
BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland respectively.  
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